Work

Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations

Year: 2021

Type: preprint

Abstract: We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can use to obtain resources; leftover tokens are worthless. We show how to support any Pareto efficient allocation in equilibrium, using anonymous resource prices and agent specific budgets. We also give computationally efficient algorithms for those tasks. In particular, this allows us to support the Rawlsian max-min allocation.

Source: arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2103.08634

Authors: Andelman, Nir, Feldman, Michal, Fiat, Amos, Mansour, Yishay

Institution: Tel Aviv University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3138224865

Cites: 12

Cited by:

Related to: 10