Work

Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case

Year: 2005

Type: article

Source: Economic Theory

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0040-z

Authors: Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanié, François Salanié

Institutions: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de Toulouse, Columbia University, Laboratoire d'Économie des Ressources Naturelles, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2163031017

FWCI: 10.98

Cites: 34

Cited by: 101

Related to: 10