Social interaction effects in the laboratory and society: Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision
Year: 2003
Type: report
Abstract: * Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank Professor Frans van Winden plus participants in informal seminars at CREED, the University of Amsterdam and New York University for helpful comments. The experiments were conducted while Bardsley was a member of the ENDEAR research group at CREED, the University of Amsterdam, and were funded by ENDEAR. Social Interaction Effects in the Laboratory and Society: Conformism and Reciprocity in Public Good Provision People contribute more to public goods, the more others give (“crowding-in”). We investigate two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformism, a neglected alternative. The issue is important since conformism has more scope to bring about endogenous social interaction effects outside the laboratory. We use Bardsley’s (2000) Conditional Information Lottery design to control “others ’ behaviour ” without deception. We observe how contributions correlate within a group and between groups. Our main result is that conformism does cause crowding-in. The common presumption of reciprocity therefore deserves to be questioned, even in the laboratory.
Source: Econstor (Econstor)
Authors: Nicholas Bardsley, Rupert Sausgruber
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Universiteit van Amsterdam
OpenAlex ID: W3153576461