Dropping Standardized Testing for Admissions: Differential Variance and Access
Year: 2020
Type: preprint
Abstract: The University of California suspended through 2024 the requirement that applicants from California submit SAT scores, upending the major role standardized testing has played in college admissions. We study the impact of such decisions and its interplay with other interventions such as affirmative action on admitted class composition.
We develop a theoretical framework to study the effect of requiring test scores on academic merit and diversity in college admissions. The model has a college and set of potential students. Each student an unobserved noisy skill level, and multiple observed application components and group membership. The college is Bayesian and maximizes an objective that depends on both diversity and merit. It estimates each applicant's true skill level using the observed features, and then admits students with or without affirmative action.
We characterize the trade-off between the (potentially positive) informational role of standardized testing in college admissions and its (negative) exclusionary nature. Dropping test scores may exacerbate disparities by decreasing the amount of information available for each applicant, especially those from non-traditional backgrounds. However, if there are substantial barriers to testing, removing the test improves both academic merit and diversity by increasing the size of the applicant pool. The overall effect of testing depends on both the variance of the test score noise and the amount of people excluded by the test requirement.
Finally, using application and transcript data from the University of Texas at Austin, we demonstrate how an admissions committee could measure the trade-off in practice.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Nikhil Garg, Hannah Li, Faidra Monachou
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3158117492