Sending Money in the Trust Game: Trust or Other-Regarding Preferences?
Year: 2003
Type: preprint
Abstract: We use the Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) Investment Game to understand whether transfers made in this game are due to trust and reciprocity, as suggested by Gneezy et al. (2000) or whether they are due to other regarding preferences, as suggested by Cox (2002). We find that amount sent by senders is strongly influenced by expectations of getting money back from the receiver. We also find that when receivers receive higher amounts they return higher amounts. We conclude that behavior in this game is in keeping with the trust and reciprocity hypothesis rather than other regarding preferences.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Authors: Ananish Chaudhuri, Lata Gangadharan
Institutions: University of Auckland, The University of Melbourne
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3162533504