Year: 2021
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: The kernels of operating systems such as Windows, Linux, and MacOS are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking. Defenses exist, but many require efficient intra-address-space isolation. Execute-only memory, for example, requires read protection on code segments, and shadow stacks require protection from buffer overwrites. Intel’s Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU) could, in principle, provide the intra-kernel isolation needed by such defenses, but, when used as designed, it applies only to user-mode application code.
Authors: Spyridoula Gravani, Mohammad Hedayati, John Criswell, Michael L. Scott
Institution: University of Rochester
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Awards: CNS Core: Medium: Reimagining the Storage Stack for Emerging Memory Technologies, G4250368390, G4504108201, CNS Core: Medium: Operating System Modularity for Safety and Performance on Existing Commodity Hardware, TWC: Small: Thwarting Kernel-Level Malware with Secure Virtual Architecture, G8876996369
OpenAlex ID: W3177545773