Work

Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Year: 2021

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal must design a contract to incentivize an agent to perform an action on behalf of the principal. We study the classical principal-agent problem in a setting where the agent can be of one of several types (affecting the outcome of actions they might take). This combines the contract theory phenomena of "moral hazard" (incomplete information about actions) with that of "adverse selection" (incomplete information about types).

Source: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)

DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467637

Authors: Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua R. Wang

Institution: Google (United States)

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

OpenAlex ID: W3177959705

FWCI: 6.597

Cites: 16

Cited by: 35

Related to: 10