Year: 2021
Type: article
Abstract: Fresh off the success of On the Origin of the Species in 1859 and The Descent of Man in 1870, Darwin published The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872. In the latter, he extended his theory of evolution by natural selection to mind and behavior, and especially to emotions, arguing that we humans inherited our emotions from our mammalian ancestors. Though little was known about the nervous system at the time, Darwin proposed that emotional inheritance occurred by way of conservation of elements of the nervous system in the mammalian lineage. Darwin’s ideas about emotions were based on his observations of similar behavioral (especially facial) expressions in emotional situations in people around the world. In accounting for this, he adopted the commonsense assumption that most people then (and now) have about emotions — that they are states of mind that cause behavioral expressions. Why else would we flee from danger if not because we feel afraid? Darwin also noted some similarities in behavioral expressions between humans and other mammals, leading him to conclude that our emotions are states of mind inherited from them. But he often described animal behavior in human emotional terms: cheerful, proud, scornful, content, jealous, contemptuous. A reporter once asked him why he talked this way: in response, he said it was kinder, and that the public was more likely to accept animals being like humans, than humans being like animals. Darwin’s romantic approach to animal behavior was quite anthropomorphic, and had a profound impact on the course of the new field of animal psychology that was emerging in the late 19th century. His acolyte, George Romanes, referred to behavior as the ambassador of the animal mind. The continuing influence of Darwin’s views on emotion research is one of the reasons why the nature of emotions is one of the most contentious topics in the study of mind and behavior today, especially in relation to the question of animal emotions. In this My word, I explore key issues in the current debate, and suggest how current understanding of human emotions, and their underpinnings in the brain, might provide a novel approach for illuminating what emotions in other animals might be like. The flagrant calling upon of conscious explanations of behavior was a major factor that led to the behaviorist revolution in psychology, which resulted in a strict ban of all talk of mental states during much of the first half of the 20th century. Emotion research did not cease in psychology, but it took a different form. Rather than being about the subjective conscious feelings that people experience, emotions were redefined as behavioral responses to stimuli. By the early 1960s, though, behaviorism was on the wane, and the topic of emotion was returning in earnest to psychology in two forms. One was so-called basic emotions theory, and the other, cognitive theory. In the tradition of Darwin, basic emotions theory proposed that a small number of primary emotions are common to all humans by virtue of our species having inherited the same ‘affect programs’ (hypothetical innate neural structures) that underlie these emotions from our mammalian ancestors1Tomkins S.S. Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Volume 1: The Positive Affects. Springer, New York1962Google Scholar,2Ekman P. Biological and cultural contributions to body and facial movement in the expression of emotions.in: Rorty A.O. Explaining Emotions. University of California Press, Berkeley1980: 73-102Google Scholar. Affect programs were said to be involved in both controlling behavioral (especially facial) and physiological body responses and the conscious experience of the emotions. Like Darwin, many said that the emotional stimulus activates the affect program and elicits the mental state of emotion, which causes behavior. But others adopted William James’ notion that the emotional stimulus, via the affect program, elicits body responses, and feedback signals from these responses define the emotional experience3Carvalho G.B. Damasio A. Interoception and the origin of feelings: A new synthesis.BioEssays. 2021; 43: 2000261Crossref Scopus (11) Google Scholar. A common list of basic emotions includes fear, happiness, anger, sadness, surprise, and disgust, but the list varies some between theorists. In addition to primary emotions, basic emotions theories also typically postulate secondary emotions — envy, jealousy, pride, contentment, and so on — that are said to be learned individually and influenced by one’s culture. The other approach to emotion reflected the new cognitive movement in psychology, which had supplanted behaviorism. Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer proposed that emotions result from the cognitive interpretation of situational factors which, for them, included the external physical and social context, and physiological responses in the brain and body4Schachter S. Singer J.E. Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state.Psychol. Rev. 1962; 69: 379-399Crossref PubMed Scopus (3226) Google Scholar. For example, if one notices their heart is beating fast in the context of the rapid approach of an angry aggressive person, fear results. But if one’s heart is beating similarly fast after exercise, no emotion needs to be attributed. Contemporary representatives of the cognitive approach fall into two categories. Appraisal theories assume that the emotion one experiences is a function of cognitive appraisals. While innate affect programs perform a primitive, non-cognitive kind of appraisal, cognitive appraisals are learned and culturally influenced, and depend on attention, memory, concepts, predictions and decision-making5Scherer K.R. Emotion as a multicomponent process: A model and some cross-cultural data.Rev. Personal. Social Psychol. 1984; 5: 37-63Google Scholar,6Ortony A. Clore G.L. Collins A. The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge1988Crossref Google Scholar. These define one’s momentary experience in terms of specific categories similar to those of basic emotions theories, but the experience arises from individual cognition rather than innate programs inherited from animals. Constructionist theories draw upon similar cognitive processes, but are less wed to specific emotion categories. These, instead, emphasize how signals resulting from interactions between arousal (high to low) and valence (positive to negative) allow us to conceptualize emotional experiences by assigning everyday emotion words to our experiences7Barrett L.F. Russell J.A. The Psychological Construction of Emotion. Guilford Press, New York2015Google Scholar. I have long been in the cognitive camp when it comes to emotional experience8LeDoux J.E. The Emotional Brain. Simon and Schuster, New York1996Google Scholar,9LeDoux J.E. Thoughtful feelings.Curr. Biol. 2020; 30: R619-R623Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google Scholar. My approach incorporates aspects of appraisal and constructionist theories, and starts with the assumption that emotions are conscious experiences that emerge in biologically or psychologically significant situations. Key to the experience is the integration of perceptual and memory signals with signals related to brain and body states to form situational, self, and emotion schema. The latter coalesce into a non-conscious, or more precisely, pre-conscious, mental model of the emotional situation. The output of the model is a narrative that constitutes the penultimate pre-conscious antecedent of the conscious emotional experience, and that is also antecedent to verbal self-report (Figure 1). The narration can be about immediate experience or about memories. The conscious emotional experience resulting from the narration is either of a particular categorical type of emotion — fear, joy, anger, jealousy, envy, pride — or a less well-defined state of distress or well-being. Because emotional situations can change moment-to-moment, the schemata, mental model, and narration can also change. As a result, the conscious experience can vacillate in real-time as well — distress may become fear or anger, or fear may suddenly become anger, jealousy or embarrassment. The view that narration and self-report are both pre-conscious is contrary to conventional wisdom, which typically has narrations and reports as post-conscious. One consequence of my view is that the experience and report may diverge to some extent as a result of differences in the post-narrative processing that is required to generate conscious awareness and speech. Despite the fact that reports are not perfect mirrors of experience, they are very useful and are considered the gold standard for scientifically assessing conscious experiences10Dehaene S. Lau H. Kouider S. What is consciousness, and could machines have it?.Science. 2017; 358: 486-492Crossref PubMed Scopus (242) Google Scholar, a fact of scientific life that poses challenges for research seeking to study emotional experiences in non-human animals. The emotion that has been studied most extensively in terms of neural circuitry is fear. Decades of animal research has implicated the brain area called the amygdala, and interconnected downstream areas, such as the hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray region, in the expression of behavioral and physiological body responses elicited by threatening stimuli8LeDoux J.E. The Emotional Brain. Simon and Schuster, New York1996Google Scholar,11LeDoux J. The amygdala.Curr. Biol. 2007; 17: R868-R874Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (911) Google Scholar. Importantly, imaging studies of amygdala neural activity, and studies of patients with amygdala damage, confirm that core findings from the animal research apply to humans12Phelps E.A. Emotion and cognition: Insights from studies of the human amygdala.Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2006; 57: 27-53Crossref PubMed Scopus (1098) Google Scholar. Neuroscientists have generally been more interested in the brain circuits controlling behavioral and physiological responses than in conscious feelings. But some have, in the spirit of Darwin, argued that the brain mechanisms that control the responses are also responsible for the conscious experience of emotions. Indeed, the amygdala and connected downstream targets, like the periaqueductal gray area, have come to be synonymous with the fear affect program, and are often also assumed to be involved in the conscious experience of fear. The late neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp13Panksepp J. Affective Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, New York1998Google Scholar, for example, wrote that “the mechanisms of affective experience and emotional behavior are intimately intertwined in comparatively ancient areas of the mammalian brain”, proposing specific subcortical circuits for each of several basic emotions in animals and humans. Nico Tinbergen, the pioneering ethologist, once pointed out that proposals about conscious feelings in animals are “merely a guess about the possible nature of the animal’s subjective state”14Tinbergen N. The Study of Instinct. Oxford University Press, New York1951Google Scholar. Indeed, many in the consciousness field believe that conscious experiences can only be studied with scientific rigor in humans, because findings from animal studies really only reveal how brain circuits control behavioral physiological responses. And in humans, the evidence for subcortical programs being responsible for conscious feelings is weaker than is sometimes claimed9LeDoux J.E. Thoughtful feelings.Curr. Biol. 2020; 30: R619-R623Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google Scholar,15LeDoux J.E. Brown R. A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 2017; 114: E2016-E2025Crossref PubMed Scopus (219) Google Scholar, 16LeDoux J.E. Anxious: Using the to and and New York2015Google Scholar, J. The of The of New Scholar. on especially circuits that to cognitive such as memory, in understanding conscious emotional J.E. The Emotional Brain. Simon and Schuster, New York1996Google Scholar,9LeDoux J.E. Thoughtful feelings.Curr. Biol. 2020; 30: R619-R623Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google Scholar,15LeDoux J.E. Brown R. A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 2017; 114: E2016-E2025Crossref PubMed Scopus (219) Google Scholar, 16LeDoux J.E. Anxious: Using the to and and New York2015Google Scholar, J. The of The of New Scholar. Positive between the experience of fear and neural have been in both and in the S. fear — a for the subjective experience of 2020; Scopus Google Scholar. studies and amygdala neural have that is more with fear than is amygdala activity, the latter is more related to physiological Lau H. between subjective fear and physiological 2020; PubMed Scopus Google Scholar. such not that a in the is evidence from of brain areas in humans. in the that of the amygdala elicited but the were by and were other and J.E. Anxious: Using the to and and New York2015Google studies more that of the amygdala elicited body responses, but only resulted in of K.R. S. amygdala on emotion and emotional PubMed Scopus Google Scholar, of several areas of elicited reports of fear and other emotional N. the an in Insights from of the human 2021; PubMed Scopus Google Scholar. I emphasize areas, and are also and when is to some I have emotional consciousness as a kind of But different of experience and often In the of subcortical brain areas in emotional consciousness, between of consciousness may a more A useful way of the different of conscious states is memory and J. The in Oxford University Press, New Scopus Google between and is said to depend on a different form of consciousness on consciousness on and consciousness on For the of states in relation to what might experience in the of a stimulus, such as a at J.E. Thoughtful feelings.Curr. Biol. 2020; 30: R619-R623Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google Scholar,15LeDoux J.E. Brown R. A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 2017; 114: E2016-E2025Crossref PubMed Scopus (219) Google Scholar, 16LeDoux J.E. Anxious: Using the to and and New York2015Google Scholar, J. The of The of New Scholar. Using memory, would the stimulus as the kind of animal of as a and would likely conceptualize the stimulus and as The result would be an of consciousness about awareness of the relation of danger to the experience of fear. the addition of memory, that about become of the experience conceptualize that may be by the The experience, at this has become an state of in which feel of what may to While states can states typically depend on the kind of that comes with all states are emotional but all emotional states are emotional states are the of emotional state we in our when we of as having emotional and that we talk about when we our emotions with And they are the of emotional feelings we about in or as when in my I half half have but states are quite from both and the in terms of of comes with with and with In other and states have conscious content, but states I for some time, about why referred to states as conscious that he called states of and connected to which are generally considered to be In an to he that he to the of being and to is typically referred to as consciousness in the as the of having a conscious experience with is called mental state consciousness in the for states are states of consciousness that control behavior an on the about the brain of emotions between basic emotions and cognitive theorists. For example, and called upon states to for emotional conscious feelings that emerge from subcortical J. A theory of mental affective experiences to and Rev. PubMed Scopus Google Scholar. the I had with one could that and But they had a different and as a between the conscious and mind. they subcortical neural states as being responsible for a form of emotional consciousness that is so that it is typically by cognitive states of emotional consciousness and not in humans. But in mammals, they these states are what conscious emotions While I and were on to view the circuitry For several I have been to model into the higher-order theory of to higher-order theory, conscious when it is especially by J.E. Brown R. A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 2017; 114: E2016-E2025Crossref PubMed Scopus (219) Google J. The of The of New H. for higher-order theories of conscious Sci. Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus Google Scholar, R. Lau H. J.E. the higher-order approach to Sci. Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus Google Scholar, J.E. Lau H. consciousness the of Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (11) Google Scholar. A key of higher-order theory is that the is not the conscious is a pre-conscious antecedent of For example, a higher-order of that a state of secondary conscious when by in by areas, especially the and areas and the (Figure The higher-order state in what I referred to as the pre-conscious mental model that is antecedent to a conscious experience (Figure 1). I proposed that this higher-order which a is — that of especially memory and related processes, may be required between a conventional state and the higher-order J.E. Thoughtful feelings.Curr. Biol. 2020; 30: R619-R623Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google R. Lau H. J.E. the higher-order approach to Sci. Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus Google Scholar, J.E. Lau H. consciousness the of Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (11) Google Scholar, J.E. the become Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus Google Scholar. I to this as a higher-order view (Figure In the of for example, the view that is to what an is — that memory be with to conceptualize and what is being And to have an experience of what the to has to be with the These I by way of of signals from to memory processing areas in the and in with what can be of as are and and These then with higher-order J.E. Thoughtful feelings.Curr. Biol. 2020; 30: R619-R623Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google R. Lau H. J.E. the higher-order approach to Sci. Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus Google Scholar, J.E. Lau H. consciousness the of Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (11) Google Scholar, J.E. the become Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus Google and The areas have been implicated in a of the of body stimulus and and the self, and also in the to and to conscious to H. The in mental and physical Rev. 2021; PubMed Scopus Google P. brain that conscious 2021; Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google Scholar. A that all of these is their in the of of about specific such as external one’s emotions, and one’s self, one’s For example, danger and in the and as well as the amygdala to the areas, situational, and fear are and a of what the is about in relation to and how might feel and in such a situation. are into a pre-conscious emotional in this mental model that the of the conscious The between an emotional and a mental model is the of an emotion that emotion to the mental is what the mental model an emotional mental model, and the experience an emotional emotional J.E. Lau H. consciousness the of Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (11) Google Scholar. What about In a My J.E. Lau H. consciousness the of Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (11) Google Scholar, Lau and I proposed like other experience, conscious experiences result from of But and conscious which are based on with content, the involved in consciousness are states that have resulted from innate of or and These states all conscious from the of what a stimulus is to the most emotional these are in areas, the result I an conscious experience that as a mental on the between consciousness and As others have they in the of consciousness, and states a feel of and to an expression by While these states are not about in they and it possible for one to their and mental states are J.E. Lau H. consciousness the of Biol. 2020; 30: Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (11) Google Scholar. to what has been said about my I not that non-human animals are that conscious My instead, is that it is likely the that non-human animals have some form of consciousness, it is to scientifically study animal S. Lau H. Kouider S. What is consciousness, and could machines have it?.Science. 2017; 358: 486-492Crossref PubMed Scopus (242) Google Scholar,15LeDoux J.E. Brown R. A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 2017; 114: E2016-E2025Crossref PubMed Scopus (219) Google Scholar, 16LeDoux J.E. Anxious: Using the to and and New York2015Google Scholar, J. The of The of New Scholar. as I often as animal consciousness, I views about animal emotions have also been Because he was so about animal emotion, it was assumed he that emotional experiences in animals are similar to the of emotional experiences that humans to with everyday such as fear or in he that emotions in animals are different from human emotional For example, he and J. A theory of mental affective experiences to and Rev. PubMed Scopus Google Scholar, referred to emotions in animals as states of other animals have conscious emotions, I believe the of what these would be is very similar to what and — states of But William James’ of which and also at is more it that emotional being on the between consciousness and are different from emotional states about one’s that the mind. we what other animals experience, if the is it would provide a for about what an animal might experience, the kind of brain it A way to in this would be to a to the that underlie and states in relation to human emotions, and then to the circuits responsible in our about human emotions, when with known similarities and differences between the of humans and other mammals, would provide an based approach for about emotions species (Figure One from such an approach is in the human brain, with consciousness common to all mammals, subcortical brain circuits areas such as the amygdala, periaqueductal and their with the A is that a form of awareness about stimulus and may between what is called the extended amygdala and the awareness of and based on may known interactions between memory and the and circuitry is well in but could to some in some other it is known that circuits that from those in mammals, but that are similar in human and non-human are and and and the These differences may underlie the of to other mammals, to to form states of circuits that most between humans and non-human have been implicated in and subjective and may to which many believe is a or at an especially human the and nature of animal emotions has been assumed from about what animals experience, of the way we and they to of stimuli. But as such are about the possible nature of the animal’s subjective that behavior is an ambassador of the mind is not it is we in humans, some such as those that are often with emotions, are not by conscious J.E. Thoughtful feelings.Curr. Biol. 2020; 30: R619-R623Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (9) Google J. The of The of New Scholar. we on behavior to us what a human is why we behavioral responses in animals reveal their what an animal is on the of what we might feel in a is as a way of with our but it is not the way to as not on to the or we not on when it comes to the of mind. While we can to verbal reports to our in humans, we have this in animal The approach proposed would only result in about the emotional experiences of animals. But the would be by about the relation of mind to brain, rather than being the result of romantic about what we the relation of behavior to mind
Source: Current Biology
Author: Joseph E. LeDoux
Institutions: NYU Langone Health, New York University
Language: English
Topic: Primate Behavior and Ecology
Domain: Life Sciences
Keywords: animal emotions, Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, evolutionary psychology, anthropomorphism, animal psychology, behaviorism, nature of emotions, mammalian nervous system, facial expressions, animal cognition, philosophy of mind, mind and behavior, history of emotion research, human-animal comparison
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $6,700
OpenAlex ID: W3181185807
