Year: 2021
Type: article
Abstract: This article explores the extent to which EU law does and should enable undertakings to control which Member State’s contribution rate applies to them. By relying on posted workers, for example, undertakings can “shop” for the cheapest social security law, lowering their labour costs; this is, however, to the detriment of workers, competitors, and social security systems. The article seeks to determine when conflict rules excessively facilitate law shopping. It then discusses how legislators and courts can complicate law shopping by framing it as abuse, redesigning rules, interpreting them teleologically, and improving their enforcement.
Source: Common Market Law Review
DOI: 10.54648/cola2021002
Author: Nicolas Rennuy
Language: English
Topic: European Law and Migration
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W3183163038
