Joint Bidding in Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study of Policy Design and Performance
Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: This study is one of the few to focus on the impact of joint bidding on conservation auction performance. With a few caveats, results indicate that the nature of incentives associated with rewarding spatial coordination in the first place will influence the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of conservation auction-based policies with joint bidding. This study is a context-neutral laboratory experiment with university students and provides evidence regarding the internal theoretical validity of the mechanism being studied. However, the findings will require further testing both in controlled and context-rich settings with producer participants before any informed policy recommendations can be made.
Source: Lincoln (University of Nebraska)
Author: Banerjee, Simanti
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3190625013