Year: 2021
Type: report
Abstract: The increased burden of disclosure and governance regulations is often cited as a key reason for the significant decline in the number of publicly-listed companies in the U.S. We explore the connection between regulatory costs and the number of listed firms by exploiting a regulatory quirk: many rules trigger when a firm's public float exceeds a threshold.Consistent with firms seeking to avoid costly regulation, we document significant bunching around multiple regulatory thresholds introduced from 1992 to 2012.We present a revealed preference estimation strategy that uses this behavior to quantify regulatory costs.Our estimates show that various disclosure and internal governance rules lead to a total compliance cost of 4.1% of the market capitalization for a median U.S. public firm.Regulatory costs have a greater impact on private firms' IPO decisions than on public firms' going private decisions.However, heightened regulatory costs only explain a small fraction of the decline in the number of public firms.
DOI: 10.3386/w29143
Authors: Michael Ewens, Kairong Xiao, Ting Xu
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3193945000
