Work

Uncovering In-DRAM RowHammer Protection Mechanisms:A New Methodology, Custom RowHammer Patterns, and Implications

Year: 2021

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: The RowHammer vulnerability in DRAM is a critical threat to system security. To protect against RowHammer, vendors commit to security-through-obscurity: modern DRAM chips rely on undocumented, proprietary, on-die mitigations, commonly known as Target Row Refresh (TRR). At a high level, TRR detects and refreshes potential RowHammer-victim rows, but its exact implementations are not openly disclosed. Security guarantees of TRR mechanisms cannot be easily studied due to their proprietary nature.

Source: IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO)

DOI: 10.1145/3466752.3480110

Authors: Hasan Hassan, Yahya Can Tugrul, Jeremie S. Kim, Victor van der Veen, Kaveh Razavi, Onur Mutlu

Institutions: ETH Zurich, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Association for Computing Machinery, Qualcomm (United States)

Language: English

Topic: Security and Verification in Computing

Subfield: Artificial Intelligence

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: green