The Primacy of Phenomenology Over Cognitivism. Towards a Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind
Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This investigation deals with the history of the reception of phenomenological philosophy in cognitive science and how this reception has altered and continues to shape the traditional view of cognition inspired by the computer metaphor of mind. The claim will be espoused that cognitive science is not devoid of a philosophical perspective and cognitivism will be characterized precisely as the philosophy behind much work in cognitive science. In conclusion, the irreducibility of philosophical questioning to cognitive science will be defended and reasons will be given as to why it matters to mount such defense.
Author: Jethro Masís
Institution: University of Würzburg
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3207181919
