Work

The epistemic value of independent lies: false analogies and equivocations

Year: 2021
Type: article
Abstract: Here I critically assess an argument put forward by Kuorikoski et al. (Br J Philos Sci, 61(3):541–567, 2010) for the epistemic import of model-based robustness analysis. I show that this argument is not sound since the sort of probabilistic independence on which it relies is unfeasible. By revising the notion of probabilistic independence imposed on the models’ results, I introduce a prima-facie more plausible argument. However, despite this prima-facie plausibility, I show that even this new argument is unsound in most if not all cases of model-based robustness analysis. This I do to demonstrate that the epistemic import of model-based robust analysis cannot be satisfactorily defended on the basis of probabilistic independence.
Source: Synthese
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,780
OpenAlex ID: W3211058963
FWCI: 5.171
Cites: 28
Cited by: 12
Related to: 10