Work

When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan

Year: 1999

Type: preprint

Abstract: This paper reports the results of a cross-country comparison between Austria andJapan for an experimental 3-personcoalition formation ultimatum game. The experimental design allows thecomparison with respect to three decisions. (i)The coalition decision, (ii) proposers' demand behavior in 2- and 3-personultimatum subgames, and (iii) theresponders' behavior in these subgames. In contrast to other cross-culturalstudies in experimental bargainingenvironments we can not find any (significant) difference in behavior betweensubjects in Austria and Japan. Weattribute the behavioral similarities mainly to a subtle focal point andresponder competition effect, which wipe outpossible cultural differences. Our conclusion is that even in environments -like bargaining - where cultural differencesmay play a prominent role the show-up of these differences is highly sensitiveto the exact context in which people act.

Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

Authors: Akira Okada, Arno Riedl

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funders: Japan Science and Technology Corporation, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Core Research for Evolutional Science and Technology

Award: G8546646505

OpenAlex ID: W327370314

Cites: 9

Cited by: 21

Related to: 10