Year: 2004
Type: article
Abstract: F ollowing the terrorist attacks of 9/11, some commentators drew a parallel between al Qaeda's strike and Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor, and between the ensuing struggle and the Second World War.There was sporadic talk of mobilization, which was easily enough dismissed as out of step with the realities of the War on Terror.Unconventional warfighters like terrorists are by definition immune to the massive concentrations of power that are the traditional object of a mobilization.At the same time, conventional war is generally regarded as oriented toward smaller, more professional, and hightech forces fighting in "demassified" conflicts.1 However, despite a great deal of hand-wringing on the part of social critics, the really difficult question was not asked: Would a World War II-scale mobilization even have been possible after 9/11 if it had been deemed an appropriate response?With a much reduced emphasis on military competition between the great powers and far less talk of American "declinism" today than there was 15 years ago, the ability of major economies to bear drastically enlarged military burdens has been discussed far less of late.Even Paul Kennedy, who popularized the declinist thesis in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in 1987, recently backed away from it.2 Nonetheless, two major developments have set the stage for a new debate on rises in military expenditures.The first of these developments is a changed economic and fiscal outlook, specifically a return to the massive US budget deficits of the 1980s, and less exuberant economic expectations than was the case just a few years ago.The illusion of perfection at no cost has largely faded.The other development is the demands placed on US forces since 9/11, with talk of their being stretched too thin by commitments in Iraq and elsewhere becoming fairly widespread.
Author: Nader Elhefnawy
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W327732381