Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
Year: 2009
Type: report
Abstract: The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions.We analyze a model with indifferencesties-in school preferences.Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -single tie breaking-in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives.Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
DOI: 10.3386/w14864
Authors: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, Alvin Roth
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
SDG: Reduced inequalities
Open Access status: green
Award: G6671297155
OpenAlex ID: W2148830493
