In What Sense Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?
Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all these criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to me, however, that a number of these criticisms are based on a number of misunderstandings of the notion of a norm and of the way it can regulated a given practice. Once we spell out in what sense knowledge can play a normative role in this context, the KAA appears much more plausible. 1. Preliminary formulations of the knowledge account The knowledge account of assertion (KAA), although it has probably been present within philosophy at least since the Pyrrhonian sceptics 1, was introduced within
Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Pascal Engel
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W38279848