Year: 2021
Type: article
Abstract: In cases where the claims of different groups of people compete, the Relevance View occupies a middle ground between aggregation and nonaggregation. It allows weaker claims to aggregate to outweigh a stronger claim just when the competing claims, compared pairwise, are sufficiently close in strength. The view has strong intuitive appeal when applied to simple binary choices, but I argue that attempts to extend it to nonbinary choices have been unsuccessful. I propose a new extension of the Relevance View to nonbinary choices based on a “binary contrastive” account of the moral reasons that obtain in the cases of interest.
Source: Ethics
DOI: 10.1086/716873
Author: Kirsten Mann
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: moral reasons, moral strength, binary choice
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4200454637
