Year: 2021
Type: article
Abstract: According to a recently developed family of relational views, whether two concepts C1and C2are the same is a matter of an external relation in which their tokens stand. In this paper, we highlight the chief contributions of Relationism in the elucidation of concept sameness, present a set of arguments to the effect that relational accounts of concept sameness fail to accommodate a substantive notion of concept publicity, and offer a diagnosis of this result. We conclude that the strengths of non‐relational approaches will also need to be considered in order to fully capture what it means for a concept to be public.
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12396
Authors: Matheus Valente, Víctor M. Verdejo
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,500
Award: G8055253262
OpenAlex ID: W4200542147
