Work

Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms

Year: 2022

Type: article

Abstract: Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility that fills this gap. Building on Hindriks’s (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the epistemic duty to join forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry.

Source: Philosophy of Science

DOI: 10.1017/psa.2022.9

Authors: Will Fleisher, Dunja Šešelja

Institutions: Georgetown University, Eindhoven University of Technology, Ruhr University Bochum

Language: English

Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,255

Funder: Háskólinn í Reykjavík