Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: According to Pure Russellianism, if (1) David believes that Hesperus is a planetis true, (2) David believes that Phosphorus is a planet is also true. It is also usually thought, by friends and foes of Pure Russellianism alike, that on it, when (1) and (2) are true, (3) David does not believe that Phosphorus is a planet cannot but be false and because of this, many departed from Pure Russellianism. In this paper, I will show that by relying on the very explanation Pure Russellianism is usually combined with to account for sentences such as (1) and (2) and by acknowledging the well-attested linguistic phenomenon of metalinguistic negation, even if (1) and (2) are true, it is not the case that on Pure Russellianism (3) cannot but be false.
Source: Inquiry
Author: Giulia Felappi
Institution: University of Southampton
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4213078588