Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: I T is a common view that philosophers treat intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories.Following Herman Cappelen, we may refer to this view as centrality. 1 Advocates of centrality typically assume that claims about cases (henceforth, case verdicts) are treated as evidence for and against philosophical theories because of their intuitiveness.On the basis of their examination of prominent philosophers' use of cases, however, critics of centrality, like Cappelen and Max Deutsch, claim that philosophers argue for case verdicts, and take that to suggest that advocates of centrality are mistaken in their assumption that the intuitiveness of the verdicts plays an epistemic role. 2 I'll refer to these critics as "intuition deniers." 3 The intuition deniers' rejection of centrality has launched a considerable debate over the nature of the philosophical method and the role of intuitions in philosophical argument.This article contributes to that debate by investigating cases from a genre of philosophy-political philosophy-that has not been the main focus so far.Within this branch (and within moral philosophy more generally), not only has it 1
Source: Journal of Political Philosophy
DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12277
Author: Sebastian J. Conte
Institution: University of Oslo
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W4213330871