Work

If Nudges Treat their Targets as Rational Agents, Nonconsensual Neurointerventions Can Too

Year: 2022

Type: article

Abstract: Andreas Schmidt and Neil Levy have recently defended nudging against the objection that nudges fail to treat nudgees as rational agents. Schmidt rejects two theses that have been taken to support the objection: that nudges harness irrational processes in the nudgee, and that they subvert the nudgee’s rationality. Levy rejects a third thesis that may support the objection: that nudges fail to give reasons. I argue that these defences can be extrapolated from nudges to some nonconsensual neurointerventions; if Schmidt’s and Levy’s defences succeed, then some nonconsensual neurointerventions neither harness irrationality, nor subvert rationality, nor fail to give reasons. This, I claim, poses a challenge both to opponents of nonconsensual neurointerventions, and to defenders of nudging.

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10285-w

Author: Thomas Douglas

Institution: University of Oxford

Language: English

Topic: Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations

Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience

Field: Neuroscience

Domain: Life Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,890

Funders: Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Education, H2020 European Research Council