Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: Paul Pietroski develops an iconoclastic account of linguistic meaning. Here, I invite him to say more about what it implies about the relations between language, truth, and conceptual content. Readers concerned with securing the objectivity of conceptual thought may be worried about his claims that typical concepts “have no extensions” and that they “fit one another better than they fit the world.” Others might applaud his anti‐extensionalism in natural‐language semantics but fear that his account re‐raises familiar problems about extensions at the level of psychology.
Source: Mind & Language
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12271
Author: David Pereplyotchik
Institution: Kent State University
Language: English
Subfield: Language and Linguistics
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4237053373