Year: 2017
Type: book
Abstract: I explore and develop the idea, due to Peter Unger, that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. Non-accidental truth is different from the absence of epistemic luck, as discussed by Pritchard. The original analysis faces two counterexamples, the Meson Case and the Light Switch Case. The former concerns knowledge of nomological necessities; the latter turns on the direction-of-fit between a belief and the facts. I propose: (ENA) S knows that P when S’s belief that P is non-accidentally true because (i) it is based on good evidence, and (ii) in and of themselves, beliefs based on good evidence tend to be true. ENA gets the two examples right, and compares favorably with safety, defeasibility, and knowledge-as-credit accounts. Lackey has claimed that the credit-based approach mishandles knowledge via testimony. I critically examine her objection, and show that ENA faces no difficulty of that sort.
Source: Oxford University Press eBooks
Author: Jonathan Vogel
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4241076110