Implicit realism impedes progress in psychology: Comment on Fried (2020)
Year: 2020
Type: preprint
Abstract: Fried (in press) argues that progress in the factor and network modeling literatures is currently impeded by inadequate theory development. Here I take issue with this conclusion, focusing on two broad concerns. First, I argue that much of Fried's criticism of previous work (e.g., of general factor models) reflects a particular set of aesthetic preferences and priorities that other researchers are under no obligation to share. Second, I argue that Fried’s central argument tacitly assumes a strong realism about psychological constructs that is difficult to defend, and has deleterious practical consequences. When stripped of its realist commitments, Fried’s paper provides the reader with little reason to suppose that improved theory development would do much to facilitate progress in psychology. I suggest that applied psychologists may want to consider an alternative possibility---namely, that models constructed at a psychological level of description are simply not very conducive to the production of effective real-world predictions or interventions.
Author: Tal Yarkoni
Institution: The University of Texas at Austin
Language: English
Subfield: General Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4242729596