Conceptual Objections
Year: 2017
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: There are two conceptual objections to the idea of justification by an infinite regress. First, there is no ground from which the justification can originate. Second, if a regress could justify a proposition, another regress could be found to justify its negation. We show that both objections are pertinent to a regress of entailments, but fail for a probabilistic regress. However, the core notion of such a regress, i.e. probabilistic support, leaves something to be desired: it is not sufficient for justification, so something has to be added. A threshold condition? A closure requirement? Both? Furthermore, the notion is said to have inherent problems, involving symmetry and nontransitivity.
Source: Springer eBooks
Authors: David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg
Institution: University of Groningen
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4249731289