Work

Information Design

Year: 2019

Type: article

Abstract: A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal. (JEL C72, D78, D82, D83)

Source: American Economic Journal Microeconomics

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170351

Author: Ina Taneva

Institution: University of Edinburgh

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: University of Texas at Austin, Economic and Social Research Council

Awards: Transparency in Procurement: The design and use of information in trading mechanisms, G7537997135