Year: 2014
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: Four accounts, three of them Kantian, of true sentences of the form ‘ exists’ are contrasted. Russell’s theory that such sentences are meaningless is contrasted with two other Kantian theories that are analogous to one another: Frege’s semantic-ascent theory and the Frege-inspired ungerade (indirect, ‘oblique’) theory. Frege’s objection to the semantic-ascent account of identity is applied, ironically with equal force, against his account of existence. A second argument favouring the ungerade theory is offered. The argument is then refuted through an application of a general strategy suggested by Kripke. A fourth theory, the deeply anti-Kantian existence-as-predicate theory, fully accommodates these results.
Source: Oxford University Press eBooks
Author: Nathan Salmon
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4253003260