Work

Argumentation in the Interpretation of Statutory Law and International Law: Not Ejusdem Generis

Year: 2022

Type: article

Abstract: This contribution bridges three fields—pragmatics, argumentation, and law. Arguments can be seen as the verbal formulation of inferences that articulate justificatory relationships, meaning that behind every argument is at least one argumentative inference. As an argumentative activity and verbal practice, legal discourse has gaps to be filled by pragmatic inference. Neo- and post-Gricean frameworks can thus tentatively be used for its analysis. Based on these frameworks, this contribution asks whether argumentation in the interpretation of statutory law is the same as in international law. More precisely, it looks at judges’ legal interpretations, which function as justifying arguments because they are constrained by rules/canons of interpretation. It is shown that neither a pragma-dialectical hierarchy of statutory canons nor a hierarchy of related presumptions carries over to international law where there is no such hierarchy.

Source: Languages

DOI: 10.3390/languages7020132

Author: Jennifer Smolka

Institution: University of Fribourg

Language: English

Topic: Legal Language and Interpretation

Subfield: Law

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $1,466