Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: Building on agency and resource dependence theories, we study the relationship between the value of initial public offerings and the extent of board independence, which we find to be an inverted U‐shape: beyond a certain threshold, board independence becomes excessive. Consistent with agency theory, the inverted U‐shaped relationship is more pronounced when ownership and control rights are separated. Consistent with resource dependence theory, the inverted U‐shaped relationship is more pronounced in companies with higher industry diversification and less pronounced when the roles of the CEO and president of the board of directors are separated.
Source: British Journal of Management
Authors: Fabio Bertoni, Michele Meoli, Silvio Vismara
Institutions: SKEMA Business School, University of Bergamo
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,600
Funder: Aix-Marseille Université
OpenAlex ID: W4283707407
