Work

Relational communication

Year: 2021

Type: article

Abstract: We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision‐making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision‐making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision‐making is disciplined by pooling states where she is most tempted to defect.

Source: Theoretical Economics

DOI: 10.3982/te3734

Authors: Anton Kolotilin, Hongyi Li

Institution: UNSW Sydney

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: diamond

Funders: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Australian Research Council

Award: Understanding and designing persuasion mechanisms