Work

Insights into the mind of a trojan designer

Year: 2019

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: The threat of inserting hardware Trojans during the design, production, or in-field poses a danger for integrated circuits in real-world applications. A particular critical case of hardware Trojans is the malicious manipulation of third-party FPGA configurations. In addition to attack vectors during the design process, FPGAs can be infiltrated in a non-invasive manner after shipment through alterations of the bitstream. First, we present an improved methodology for bitstream file format reversing. Second, we introduce a novel idea for Trojan insertion.

Source: Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC)

DOI: 10.1145/3287624.3288742

Authors: Maik Ender, Pawel Swierczynski, Sebastian Wallat, Matthias Wilhelm, Paul Martin Knopp, Christof Paar

Institutions: Ruhr University Bochum, European School of Management and Technology

Language: English

Topic: Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security

Subfield: Hardware and Architecture

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Funders: National Science Foundation, European Commission, H2020 European Research Council

Awards: G434337789, TWC: Medium: Designing Strongly Obfuscated Hardware with Quantifiable Security against Reverse Engineering, Exploring and Preventing Cryptographic Hardware Backdoors: Protecting the Internet of Things against Next-Generation Attacks