Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism: Do the Prolegomena Indicate a Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations?
Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: Ever since Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall presented Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (1982), the question of the relation of phenomenology to cognitive science has been, if not answered, at least discussed. Dreyfus tried to answer this question in terms of the work of Jerry Fodor. From a Husserlian “point of view,” Dreyfus contended, “Fodor is rediscovering a very important discipline: the phenomenological theory of cognition, which Hume and Kant saw dimly and which Husserl brought into its own” (15). This answer, however, proved to be very unpopular (though see Pokropski 2020 ), and was immediately rejected by Husserlians, both before (McIntyre, 1986 ) and after (Brown, 1990 ; Woodruff Smith, 1995 , 342) the discovery of the potential of neural networks as an explanatory apparatus for cognitive phenomena (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986 ; Smolensky, 1991 ).
Source: Husserl Studies
Author: Jesse D. Lopes
Institution: University of Warwick Science Park
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,990
OpenAlex ID: W4296453857