Work

Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms

Year: 2022

Type: preprint

Abstract: A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from her menu. We provide novel menu descriptions of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC) matching mechanisms. For TTC, our description additionally yields a proof of the strategyproofness of TTC's traditional description, in a way that we prove is impossible for DA.

Source: arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2209.13148

Authors: Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Heffetz, Ori, Thomas, Clayton

Institutions: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Cornell University, Princeton University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: National Science Foundation, Microsoft Research, Northwestern University

Awards: Collaborative Research: AF: Medium: Modern Combinatorial Optimization: Incentives, Uncertainty, and Smoothed Analysis, NSF-BSF: Mechanism Design for All, Understanding the Dynamics of Wave- and Current-supported Turbidity Currents via High-performance High-fidelity Numerical Simulations

OpenAlex ID: W4297944296

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