The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games
Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequential play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooperation rate by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or very high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or very high in both settings. (JEL C72, C73)
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200268
Authors: Riccardo Ghidoni, Sigrid Suetens
Institutions: Tilburg University, University of Bologna
Language: English
Subfield: Safety Research
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4307639448