Work

Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris

Year: 2022

Type: article

Abstract: A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. The choice of bargaining game influences participation levels, emission quotas and technology investment levels. I derive several predictions that are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement—including the transitioning from the former to the latter.

Source: The Economic Journal

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac076

Author: Bård Harstad

Institution: University of Oslo

Language: English

Topic: Climate Change Policy and Economics

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Climate action, Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,834