Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: Alessandra Taniesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self' develops an internalist account of epistemic vice. On this view, epistemic vices are grounded in attitudes towards the self: fatalism, self-satisfaction, narcissistic infatuation, and self-abasement. The account is internalist insofar as it claims to ground both the nature and the normativity of vice within the subject's skull. In this paper, I argue against vice internalism: epistemic vices, I show, need a normative hook outside the skull to explain their vicious nature. In other words, the 'mis' in the 'mismeasure' of the self demands externalist unpacking.
Source: Inquiry
Author: Mona Simion
Institution: University of Glasgow
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4319787743