Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: My aim here is (1) to argue that the usual argument for thinking that dysfunction has no place in a dispositionalist approach to functions is deeply flawed and (2) to develop a positive account of the explanatory role dysfunction attributions play in dispositionalist-style functional analysis. I also argue that while my account undermines one common motivation for preferring an etiological over a dispositionalist approach, perhaps more interestingly, it also blurs the boundary between the two and opens a path to unifying them.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.30
Author: Brandon A. Conley
Institutions: Washington and Lee University, Clemson University
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,255
OpenAlex ID: W4321102400