Work

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible Goods

Year: 2023

Type: preprint

Abstract: In this study, we propose the polyhedral clinching auction for indivisible goods, which has so far been studied for divisible goods. As in the divisible setting by Goel et al. (2015), our mechanism enjoys incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and Pareto optimality, and works with polymatroidal environments. A notable feature for the indivisible setting is that the whole procedure can be conducted in time polynomial of the number of buyers and goods. Moreover, we show additional efficiency guarantees, recently established by Sato for the divisible setting: The liquid welfare (LW) of our mechanism achieves more than 1/2 of the optimal LW, and that the social welfare is more than the optimal LW.

Source: arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2303.00231

Authors: Hirai, Hiroshi, Sato, Ryosuke

Institutions: Nagoya University, Keio University

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology

Awards: Auction design for two-sided markets: an approach from discrete optimization, A study on auctions in two-sided markets via discrete optimization, G8058665615, G925228835

OpenAlex ID: W4322832048

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