Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: The Andalusian Ẓāhirī scholar Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) argued that the revealed text's literal meanings should be based and the methods he saw as human intervention like re’y (opinion), qiyās (jurisprudential analogy), is-tihsān (juristic preference), etc., should be abandoned altogether. He put forward many criticisms of the theory of qiyās presented in works of the mainstream jurisprudence method. One of them is about questioning the value of analogy knowledge in terms of logic. This study aims to reveal the fundamentals of Ibn Hazm's criticism of qiyās in terms of logic. In this direction, Ibn Hazm's understanding of logic and knowledge and his unique views and criticisms about the time, which analogy was attached to Islamic studies, were examined. Then, the determinations and objections of Ibn Hazm, which he expressed by referring to the logic regarding the knowledge value of qiyās, were discussed. Consequently, it has been determined that Ibn Hazm evaluated the qiyās within the naqıs part of the induction method in logic and therefore opposed the reliance on its results. Because, in qiyās, a particular is reached concerning another particular without examining whole other particulars connected to the same universal. Thus, a judgment is achieved by referring to knowledge based on assumptions and conjectures. In jurisprudence, instead, Ibn Hazm proposed to take the logical analogy (syllogism) as a method that applies the deductive method and gives the same judgment to all particulars of a whole or noun, regardless of the similarity between them.
Source: Mevzu – Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi
Author: Muhammet Ali Acar
Institution: Sakarya University
Language: Turkish
Subfield: Religious studies
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4323842344