Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: This paper introduces and argues for contrastivism about intentions. According to contrastivism, intention is not a binary relation between an agent and an action. Rather, it is a ternary relation between an agent, an action, and an alternative. Contrastivism is introduced via a discussion of cases of known but (apparently) unintended side effects. Such cases are puzzling. They put pressure on us to reject a number of highly compelling theses about intention, intentional action, and practical reason. And they give rise to a puzzle about rather-than constructions such as ‘I intend toϕrather thanψ’: In side effect cases it can seem wrong to claim that the subject intends toϕyet acceptable to claim that they intend toϕrather thanψ. This cries out for explanation. Contrastivism provides a unified response to all of these problems.
DOI: 10.1017/apa.2022.33
Author: ANDREW PEET
Institution: University of Leeds
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,255
OpenAlex ID: W4366393497