Work

Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resources

Year: 2023

Type: conference-abstract

Abstract: We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each of whom may request to use the resource over multiple consecutive rounds, receiving some utility only if they get to use the resource for the full duration of their request. Such settings are of particular significance in scientific research where large-scale instruments such as electron microscopes, particle colliders, or telescopes are shared between multiple research groups; this model also subsumes and extends existing models of repeated non-monetary allocation where the resource is demanded only for a single round.

Source: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)

DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597723

Authors: Siddhartha Banerjee, Giannis Fikioris, Eva Tardos

Institution: Cornell University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: bronze

Funders: National Science Foundation, Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, University of California Berkeley, Air Force Office of Scientific Research

Awards: CAREER: Harnessing Prediction Engines and Non-Monetary Mechanisms for Real-Time Decision Making, G302362212, G4759414380, G5357233996

OpenAlex ID: W4380985376

Cites:

Cited by: 4

Related to: 10