Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: Charitable interpreters of David Hume set aside his sprinkles of piety. Better to read him as lying than as clumsily inconsistent. We argue that the attribution of lies can pay dividends in historical scholarship no matter how strongly the theorist condemns lying. Accordingly, we show that our approach works even with one of the strongest condemners of lying: Immanuel Kant. We argue that Kant lied in his scholarly work and even in the first Critique. And we defend the claim that this lie attribution, strange as it may sound, amounts to a kind of scholarly charity.
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12442
Authors: Ian Proops, Roy Sorensen
Institutions: The University of Texas at Austin, University of St Andrews
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4381335492