Year: 2023
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: The widespread dependency on open-source software makes it a fruitful target for malicious actors, as demonstrated by recurring attacks. The complexity of today’s open-source supply chains results in a significant attack surface, giving attackers numerous opportunities to reach the goal of injecting malicious code into open-source artifacts that is then downloaded and executed by victims.This work proposes a general taxonomy for attacks on open-source supply chains, independent of specific programming languages or ecosystems, and covering all supply chain stages from code contributions to package distribution. Taking the form of an attack tree, it covers 107 unique vectors, linked to 94 real-world incidents, and mapped to 33 mitigating safeguards.User surveys conducted with 17 domain experts and 134 software developers positively validated the correctness, comprehensiveness and comprehensibility of the taxonomy, as well as its suitability for various use-cases. Survey participants also assessed the utility and costs of the identified safeguards, and whether they are used.
Institutions: Systems, Applications & Products in Data Processing (Switzerland), Systems, Applications & Products in Data Processing (United Kingdom), Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France, Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique, Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, Université Rennes 1
Language: English
Subfield: Information Systems
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4385208592