Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future
Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: I study the optimal provision of information in a long‐term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses public actions that affect the welfare of both players. I solve for the sender's optimal policy in closed form: the sender reports the value of the state with a delay that shrinks over time and eventually vanishes. Even when the receiver knows the current state, the sender retains leverage by threatening to conceal the future evolution of the state.
Source: Econometrica
DOI: 10.3982/ecta17345
Author: Ian Ball
Institution: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $4,800
OpenAlex ID: W4385360445