Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: This note presents a short reply to Henderson’s critical discussion of Schurz’s approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise—namely, an approximation condition—that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson’s approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.102
Author: Gerhard Schurz
Institution: Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4385701626