Work

Repeated Bidding with Dynamic Value

Year: 2023

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: We consider a repeated auction where the buyer's utility for an item depends on the time that elapsed since his last purchase. We present an algorithm to build the optimal bidding policy, and then, because optimal might be impractical, we discuss the cost for the buyer of limiting himself to shading policies.

Source: HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2308.01755

Authors: Heymann, Benjamin, Gilotte, Alexandre, Chan-Renous, Rémi

Institutions: Centre Inria de Saclay, Criteo (France), FAIRPLAY: IA coopérative : équité, vie privée, incitations

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W4385985759

FWCI:

Cites: 25

Cited by:

Related to: 10