Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: Modern System-on-Chip designs typically use Network-on-Chip (NoC) fabrics to implement coordination among integrated hardware blocks. An important class of security vulnerabilities involves a rogue foundry reverse-engineering the NoC topology and routing logic. In this paper, we develop an infrastructure, ObNoCs , for protecting NoC fabrics against such attacks. ObNoCs systematically replaces router connections with switches that can be programmed after fabrication to induce the desired topology. Our approach provides provable redaction of NoC functionality: switch configurations induce a large number of legal topologies, only one of which corresponds to the intended topology. We implement the ObNoCs methodology on Intel Quartus™ Platform, and experimental results on realistic SoC designs show that the architecture incurs minimal overhead in power, resource utilization, and system latency.
DOI: 10.1145/3609107
Authors: Dipal Halder, Maneesh Merugu, Sandip Ray
Institution: University of Florida
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4386569057